RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PROXY VOTING PRINCIPLES

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This document sets out our views and more detail on key issues and the broad principles that help shape our approach as we seek to vote proxies in clients’ best long-term economic interests pursuant to our Proxy Voting Policy.

As active investors, well informed investment research and stewardship of our clients’ investments are important aspects of our responsible investment activities. Our approach to this is framed in the relevant Responsible Investment Policies we maintain and publish. These policy documents provide an overview of our approach in practice (e.g., around the integration of environmental, social and governance (ESG) and sustainability research and analysis).

As part of this, acting on behalf of our clients and as shareholders of a company, we are charged with responsibility for exercising the voting rights associated with that share ownership. Unless clients decide otherwise, that forms part of the stewardship duty we owe our clients in managing their assets. Subject to practical limitations, we therefore aim to exercise all voting rights for which we are responsible, although exceptions do nevertheless arise (for example, due to technical or administrative issues, including those related to Powers of Attorney, share blocking, related option rights or the presence of other exceptional or market-specific issues). This provides us with the opportunity to use those voting rights to express our views on relevant aspects of the business of a company, to highlight concerns to the board, to promote good practice and, when appropriate, to exercise related rights. In doing so, we have an obligation to ensure that we do that in the best long-term economic interests of our clients and in keeping with the mandate we have from them.

Corporate governance has particular importance to us in this context, which reflects our view that well governed companies are better positioned to manage the risks and challenges inherent in business, and capture opportunities that help deliver sustainable growth and returns for our clients. Governance is a term used to describe the arrangements and practices that frame how directors and management of a company organise and operate in leading and directing a business on behalf of the shareholders of the company. Such arrangements and practices give effect to the mechanisms through which companies facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights and define the extent to which these are equitable for all shareholders.

We recognise that companies are not homogeneous and some variation in governance structures and practice is to be expected. In formulating our approach, we are also mindful of best practice standards and codes that help frame good practice, including international frameworks and investment industry guidance. While we are mindful of company and industry specific issues, as well as normal market practice, in considering the approach and proposals of a company we are guided solely by the best long-term economic interests of our clients along with their mandate and will consider any issues and related disclosures or explanations in that context.
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS

The shareholder membership of listed companies is generally made up (directly or indirectly) of diverse individuals and institutions whose views, interests, goals and time horizons can vary considerably.

Nevertheless, as shareholders, having confidence that the capital we commit to a company will be protected from misuse (e.g. from any potential agency conflicts) and will be prudently managed is important to us, our clients, and as a factor in the development and proper functioning of capital markets.

It is not the role of shareholders to micromanage businesses, rather it is the role and duty of directors to promote the long-term success of their company as noted in the next section. Nevertheless, by virtue of their share-ownership interest and position, shareholders are afforded certain rights to ensure, amongst other things, that appropriate leadership of the business is in place (e.g. through the appointment of the directors), that their performance is reviewed (e.g. through receipt of the annual report & accounts, updates and general meetings), that they can approve the broad parameters of the company’s authorities (e.g. in agreeing capital authorities), and approve the appointment or ratification of external auditors, or indeed to exercise other rights afforded to shareholders (e.g. to requisition matters for consideration at General meetings).

Shareholder rights, framed in law, regulation and a company’s formational documents (i.e., bylaws or articles of association), are an important and integral part of corporate governance frameworks and the context in which we retain confidence in committing capital to businesses, to support their growth, development and success. This is particularly true in terms of ensuring that minority shareholders’ rights and interests will be respected. Arrangements or actions that detract from these rights and interest (including control distortions) need to be avoided.

While the precise nature and scope of shareholder rights vary across jurisdictions and many related aspects of our expectations are touched upon in other parts of these Principles, a number merit direct mention in this context:

EQUAL TREATMENT OF ALL SHAREHOLDERS

One share one vote: Ordinary or common shares should feature one vote for each share and discriminatory voting rights or equivalent arrangements are neither appropriate nor welcome. Companies need to disclose sufficient information about the key attributes of all of the group’s capital structure (including minority interests in subsidiaries) to enable a proper understanding of the structures in place and their implications.

Controlling shareholder agreements: where a company has a controlling shareholder (whether by virtue of the control of voting rights or through board representation) it should put an agreement in place to safeguard the independence of the company and ability of the board to fulfill its duties to the shareholders as a whole.

SHAREHOLDER APPROVALS

Boards should ensure that shareholders have the ability and right to:

- effectively exercise their voting rights across the full range of business normally associated with general meetings of a company in line with market best practice (e.g. the election of individual directors, discharge authorities, capital authorities, auditor appointment, major or related party transactions etc.).
- place items on the agenda of general meetings, and to propose resolutions subject to reasonable limitations;
- call a meeting of shareholders for the purpose of transacting the legitimate business of the company; and that shareholder rights are not circumvented through, for example, the introduction or maintenance of limitations in the company’s formational documents.
SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT

Boards should ensure that:

- Clear, consistent and effective reporting to shareholders is undertaken at regular intervals and that they remain aware of shareholder sentiment on major issues to do with the business, its strategy and performance. Where significant shareholder dissent is emerging or apparent (e.g. through the voting levels seen at General Meetings), boards should act to address that.

- Boards should also allow a reasonable opportunity for the shareholders at a general meeting to ask questions about or make comments on the management of the company, and to ask the external auditor questions related to the audit.

As an institutional shareholder, stewardship is about more than just voting and include monitoring and reviews of companies’ activities and developments. Where appropriate it may also include engagement with companies on matters such as strategy, performance, risk, capital structure, standards of operational practice, including environmental, social and governance factors. Our broad approach to these stewardship responsibilities and activities are set out in our Global Stewardship Statement.

SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS

Shareholder resolutions represent the exercise of a key shareholder right and may encompass a wide range of issues.

As such, we assess shareholder resolutions in light of good practice, the standards already applied by a company, how proportionate the proposals are, their alignment with our philosophy and approach, as well any potential conflicts with our clients’ interests. We will incorporate into our decision whether a shareholder resolution is binding in nature or advisory (non-binding) in applying these considerations.

THE BOARD

Strong corporate governance starts with a balanced, effective, and independent board. The directors are collectively responsible for the long-term success and ongoing evolution in the leadership of the company, within a framework of prudent and effective oversight, policies and controls.

The board is thus responsible for providing leadership to the business, setting and monitoring the strategy, overseeing its management and implementation, as well as for ensuring that a culture of integrity and strong standards is maintained across all activities and operations. Not least this should enable business opportunities and risk to be assessed and responded to appropriately.

Boards need to have appropriate independent membership and an effective balance and diversity (re: skills, knowledge, experience, race/ethnicity, gender, approach and perspectives) that complements the strategy, operations and footprint of the business. For non-executive (supervisory) directors (NEDs), the ability to provide objective input and scrutiny, on behalf of the shareholders, is essential in ensuring diversity of thought and integrity in board deliberations. In this context, the importance of true independence of thought is critical. NEDs need to be reflective and thoughtful in their approach, being able to ask challenging, often difficult questions, while offering considered and constructive input to board discussions, based on sound judgement. The same holds true in terms of board committee membership.

Suitably independent committees are one important mechanism for non-executive supervisory directors to achieve this, whether that is in respect of risk, audit, succession or remuneration, so as to enable them to participate effectively as part of the board and in their role as directors of the business.

As part of this dynamic, well considered succession planning, orientation, on-going briefings, updates and annual evaluations (that make regular use of external facilitation) of the board, its sub-committees and members are essential.
All directors should be able to allocate sufficient time to the company to discharge their responsibilities fully and effectively and have an appropriate knowledge of the business and access to its operations and staff. Given the important role and duties of a board member, it is important that directors are not over-boarded and can maintain consistent participation at all their board and committee meetings and their wider engagement with the companies they lead.

All directors should be subject to annual election. However, in markets where that is not normal or best practice, we expect all directors to be subject to re-election in line with local market best practice, but in any case, at least every four years. At the same time, arrangements that might entrench boards or management, or otherwise insulate them from accountability, should be avoided.

Given their role and duties, directors should also ensure that they are well informed about the views and/or concerns of shareholders, as well as understanding the dynamic around their broader stakeholders (including bondholders, pension fund trustees, employees, customers, suppliers and the communities they operate in).

**CHAIR OF THE BOARD**

The Board Chair has a crucial function in providing leadership in the boardroom, setting the right context in terms of the board’s overall responsibility for the oversight of the business and its strategy. It is the Board Chair’s role to manage the board agenda and the provision of information to directors, as well as to ensure open boardroom discussion that enables the directors to have effective dialogue and provide the constructive challenge that a company needs. This role is distinct from the role of a chief executive officer who leads the day-to-day running of the business and implementation of the strategy.

We expect the Board Chair (or lead/senior independent director) to ensure that the board is aware of the views and considers concerns raised by shareholders, whether through ongoing dialogue and engagement with shareholders or where notable dissent has been indicated through shareholder voting.

We recognise that in some markets the combination of roles is not uncommon, nevertheless we regard the separation of the roles of the Board Chair and the CEO to be a matter of good practice and governance. In light of experience, we consider that this separation encourages collegial decision-making on matters of importance for a public company, and a balanced board, and it also mitigates potential conflicts of interest. Not least it also helps mitigate against the risk of a concentration of decision making powers in the hands of a single individual. Separation is deemed to improve the board’s capacity for independent decision making and increases accountability.

The Chair of the Board’s role should be complemented by an independent non-executive director appointed as the senior or lead independent director, who can provide a sounding board for the chair and serve as a deputy and intermediary for the other directors and, indeed, shareholders when necessary.

**CAPITAL MANAGEMENT**

Prudent capital management is a key building block for the long-term success of a business, supporting the strategy and ensuring its ability to weather adverse economic conditions. Clarity on the capital structure plans, related disciplines and how they relate to the strategy for growth, capital investment and M&A, or to share buybacks, dividends and/or other distributions, is a critical ingredient in building a shared understanding of the business with shareholders and other providers of capital.

From a shareholder perspective the rationale for and potential dilution from equity capital issuances and, for example, the risks of poorly timed or structured share buybacks are important considerations in granting capital authorities at shareholder meetings. These activities can have significant implications and need to be approached by boards and management with care and consideration for shareholder interests.

In seeking shareholder approval for equity capital issuance authorities, companies should ensure the rationale for policy on, and approach to, the use of such authorities is disclosed. Routine disapplication of pre-emption rights (pro-rata rights of first refusal) should not exceed 10% (or lower where that is market practice) and authorities should be structured in line with best practice.
Similarly, prudent management of debt through the cycle is important. Boards should ensure they monitor and oversee the maintenance of prudent levels of debt (e.g., average net-debt not just the year-end position) and leverage in the business and balance sheet, which should extend to contingent and off-balance sheet liabilities. They should also ensure that sudden spikes in leverage can be explained in the context of the broader long-term business strategy. Large, unexplained or unjustified authorities to issue debt, or to increase or remove debt limits set out in a company’s formational documents, can raise potentially significant concerns for both long-term shareholders and bondholders, which the board needs to be mindful of.

Taking on debt solely to fund buybacks and/or hit ‘per-share’ targets such as EPS established under short-term variable remuneration schemes should be explained and a robust rationale provided.

Any exceptional cases should be supported by a substantive justification and explained properly to shareholders.

MAJOR TRANSACTIONS

Mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and disposals are a regular feature of business and the capital markets. In many cases these are a normal part of the management and development of a business and the implementation of its strategy. However, large, inappropriate or poorly executed transactions can also lead to operational issues, significant write-downs and shareholder value destruction.

Boards should be actively involved in the planning for and assessment of potential transactions, ensuring that an appropriately disciplined approach (to both acquisitions and disposals) is maintained that is clearly aligned with the strategy. Ensuring appropriate and effective oversight of such activity is critical and monitoring the integration and subsequent performance against plan and related objectives (including synergies) is an important role of the board.

Where major transactions are not subject to shareholder approval, companies should consider the views of their major shareholders, subject to regulatory constraints and shareholders’ policies on being made “insiders”.

RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS

The scope for conflicts and abuse in related party transactions in any market is a potentially significant issue. Such concerns can arise in relation to individual transactions or from the number, nature or pattern of them. Alongside appropriate procedures to identify and manage conflicts of interest, boards should have a robust, independent process for reviewing, approving and monitoring related party transactions (both individual transactions and in aggregate).

A committee of independent directors, with the ability to take independent advice, should review related party transactions, their nature and their incidence or aggregate levels, to determine whether they are necessary, appropriate and in the best interests of the company and, if so, agree what terms are fair for other shareholders. All related party transactions should be reported to the board and be subject to approval.

The company should also disclose transactions that are significant, whether by virtue of their materiality to the business, the individuals involved or given the risk of perceived conflicts of interest, along with the rationale for allowing them.

Where a related party transaction is allowed to proceed it must be:

- subject to proper oversight by the board and regular review (e.g., audit, shareholder approval);
- clearly justified and not be detrimental to the long-term interests of the company;
- undertaken in the normal course of business;
- undertaken on fully commercial terms;
- in line with best practice; and
- in the interests of all shareholders.
TAX MANAGEMENT

Tax management approached prudently and legally, is part of the responsible management of a company’s affairs. Artificial or ‘aggressive’ tax strategies and constructs create imprudent risks for a company.

They can pose potentially significant reputation and commercial risks for those that are, or are perceived to be, pushing the boundaries of tax practice by, for example, exploiting loopholes and tax havens to avoid paying tax. The same reputation risks hold in respect of the directors of companies involved in such practices and the perception of the culture and attitudes it evidences. This applies equally to the use of tax avoidance structures in executive compensation arrangements, as it does at a corporate level.

From an investor perspective, tax management offers an insight into the culture predominant in a company and the attitudes and risk appetite of the management and directors. It also offers an additional indicator on the quality of earnings, risk and potential liabilities of a business, which can be relevant in terms of valuation and the investment quality of a business.

We expect the board to take a responsible approach to overseeing a company’s approach to and policy on tax and the related risks, to ensure that the company’s approach is and remains prudent and sustainable. The risks arising from engineered tax optimisation practices should be understood and avoided; those arising from policy reforms (e.g. those being coordinated by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and other authorities) should be properly mitigated. The board should regularly review the business’s tax policy, its implementation and the related risks, as well as in response to significant events that may affect it. A summary of the tax policy and related codes of conduct should be published by companies, highlighting the approach to managing the associated risks.

In terms of changes in tax domicile or re-incorporation, while economic benefit may be gained, there should be no diminution of shareholders rights as a result of the changes, nor triggering of variable compensation as a result of the associated technical, legal or structural changes required.

ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS

Annual reports and accounts are a key reference document for shareholders and the providers of a company’s long-term capital. They should provide a summary account of the board’s stewardship of the business that year (as opposed say to being designed or prepared for a secondary market context i.e. decision usefulness), whilst setting a direction of travel for the future.

In the annual report, the board should present a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s strategy, business plan, objectives, KPIs, capital and assets, operations, risks, challenges, performance and prospects in its annual report. This should include how the business’ approach is adapting to major trends (e.g. from technology, climate change or demographics etc.) that could have a material impact on the business and the related risks and opportunities it sees and how they affect the sustainability of the business and its long-term prospects.

The annual financial statements (accounts) need to be prepared on a prudent basis and present a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the business, its assets, liabilities, financial position and distributable profit or the loss. Boards should ensure that aggressive accounting practices are avoided and recognise that headline compliance with accounting standards, where significant judgement and discretion can be used, is unlikely of itself to effectively provide comfort that a ‘true & fair view’ is being maintained. Boards should ensure company practice does not fall into the trap of accounting form over substance.

The annual report and accounts are a reflection of the quality and prudence of management and the board of directors. Managements should strive for perfection in delivering these important documents. Errors and omissions may ultimately factor in our view toward the constitution and effectiveness of management and the board.

While recognising the differences that exist in market norms and dynamics, we expect companies to plan for and look to the long-term in their reporting. The board should ensure that the company does not become fixated on quarterly numbers at the expense of investment for the long-term.
EXTERNAL AUDIT

The statutory audit is a significant and important shareholder and creditor protection mechanism, to which we attach considerable importance. Its purpose is to protect the company itself from errors, omissions or, potentially, wrongdoing, as well as to signal any issues to shareholders to enable them to engage with the directors, not least through the general meeting.

Companies should, therefore, ensure that the relationship with the auditor is clearly owned and overseen by the Audit Committee and that they maintain a robust, independent and effective audit and that the auditors are and are seen to be independent. As part of this, companies should have a clear policy on the approach to and general timeframes relating to re-tendering the audit contract.

Non-audit work should be kept to a minimum, require prior audit committee approval and largely be restricted to audit related work. Audit committees should also oversee any work undertaken by other audit firms to ensure that the company’s options and choice of alternative auditors is not compromised by potential conflicts.

INTERNAL AUDIT AND RISK COMMITTEES

Companies need to maintain an effective system of internal control, which should be measured against internationally accepted standards of internal audit and tested periodically for its adequacy.

Companies are encouraged to have an internal audit function that supports the board and executives in the oversight and management of risks. We expect financial institutions to maintain a separate risk committee and support this practice, where appropriate, in other companies.

COMPENSATION/REMUNERATION

Executive pay has been a persistent area of concern and controversy over the years. Given the problems around executive pay inflation, widening pay differentials, questions about the linkage with performance and perceived rewards for failure, and complexity, compensation (remuneration) committees need to ensure a prudent approach is maintained.

We expect a substantial proportion of executive pay to be performance based, vesting according to the achievement of stretching performance metrics that are clearly aligned with the company’s strategy, management’s value creation and the experience of its shareholders. In terms of pay and overall employee costs, we will have particular regard to the relative levels of pay compared to the performance of the business, and distributions to shareholders.

In relation to any accompanying pensions arrangements, including cash contributions in lieu thereof as well as benefits more broadly, we expect applicable valuations (i.e. contribution rates in the context of pensions) to be set prudently under the circumstances. Where any pensions benefit provided to executives is enhanced as compared to equivalent benefits provided to the wider workforce, we will consider this in our evaluation of the fairness and proportionality of the total remuneration package.

Across a company’s pay arrangements, structural or technical provisions that can weaken or undermine the principle of pay for performance, need to be avoided, and change-in-control arrangements should be prudent and not linked to outlier practices. Similarly, we are generally supportive of local market best practices that enhance the alignment of pay and performance, such as retention and deferral arrangements, malus/ clawback, reasonable all-employee share schemes etc. Consideration should also be given to the disclosures required around pay ratios and the ramifications for the companies in which we invest.
Broadly speaking, compensation (remuneration) committees should look to ensure that their company’s pay arrangements are:

1. Clear, simple and understandable;
2. Balanced and proportionate, in respect of structure, deliverables, opportunity and the market;
3. Aligned with the long-term strategy, related key performance indicators and risk management discipline;
4. Linked robustly to the delivery of performance;
5. Delivering outcomes that reflect value creation and the shareholder ‘experience’; and
6. Structured to avoid pay for failure or the avoidance of accountability to shareholders.

Where a company consults with its shareholders on its executive pay arrangements, the compensation (remuneration) committee chair should take ownership and lead that process, ensuring proper two-way dialogue, as deference to consultants undermines credibility. That said, pay is only one aspect of the dialogue we need to have or prioritise with companies. As a result, we would note that, generally, we only look to participate directly in such consultations where we are a significant shareholder.

CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

Well run or improving companies are better positioned to adapt to and manage the risks and challenges inherent in business. As investors, a holistic focus on the characteristics and exposures of a business provides us with a valuable insight into important aspects of the opportunities it has and its quality.

SUSTAINABILITY THEMES

Sustainability themes (whether social or environmental in nature) are catalysts of change, creating both risks and opportunities. A company’s ability not only to adapt to but also to capitalise on the opportunities such themes highlight – by innovating and commercialising solutions (outputs, products or services) that respond to them – are relevant to investors given the long-term economic benefits they can generate for investors. Companies should make appropriate and integrated disclosures reflecting touch points for their strategy, R&D, capex, operational performance and commercial aspirations.

In doing so, companies should be mindful of the growing interest that exists amongst investors and other stakeholders in how a company’s approach to sustainability themes is aligned with the policy principles set out in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Impact oriented investment is a small but fast-growing part of the investment landscape.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) PRACTICES

A company’s recognition and management of its material ESG exposures and related disclosures provide shareholders with an additional lens through which to assess the quality, leadership, strategic focus, risk management and operational standards of practice of a business. Reflecting our philosophy on the importance of integrating ESG considerations into our assessment of how well a business is run, we will consider the level and effectiveness of ESG disclosure made by companies in their annual reports and other materials. Our focus will be on those factors deemed material to businesses in a given sector, with a focus on practices that we consider are unsustainable, create potential risks or adverse impacts to stakeholders, or which are in need of improvement to avoid erosion of shareholder value.

As investors, in framing and assessing what are the material ESG factors for a business, we draw on the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB)’s materiality framework. SASB’s mission is to help businesses identify, manage and report on the sustainability topics that matter most given their industry. Their standards have been developed based on extensive research and feedback from companies, investors, and other market participants as part of a transparent, publicly-documented process. While companies may have specific exposures unique to their circumstances, the SASB standards form the basis and starting point for assessing and monitoring a company’s ESG characteristics and their economic impact.
Where management and the board have not demonstrated adequate standards of practice, or effort to be transparent in how they address and mitigate material ESG issues or are considered to be failing to adequately address current or emergent risks that may threaten shareholder value in the future, we may take voting action to highlight this.

CLIMATE RISK

Climate risk is and will increasingly be a focus for companies and investors. The growing number of regulatory interventions and the public debate around climate change make this a distinct issue in its own right.

The 2016 Paris Agreement set a number of globally agreed goals on climate change and greenhouse gas emissions reduction. Policy interventions, regulatory changes and initiatives, such as the Financial Stability Board’s Taskforce on Climate Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), provide a clear indication of the importance attached to this issue.

The TCFD recommendations provide a framework in which climate related issues can be assessed and disclosed, to enable:

i. an understanding how resilient an organisation’s strategy is to climate-related risks;
ii. appropriate pricing of climate related risks and opportunities; and a
iii. a broad understanding of the financial systems’ exposure to climate related risk.

As investors, we recommend the TCFD framework for facilitating the development of effective disclosures. These disclosures, as well as those sought by CDP, are ever more important in the assessments that need to be made by investors. A company’s exposure and approach to climate change, related plans, risks, standards and targets, as well as the operational and commercial opportunities being pursued, are increasingly ‘decision useful’ matters to investors and can have a direct impact on shareholder value.

Where management and the board have not provided adequate or relevant disclosures to facilitate and enable effective assessments of how climate risks are being addressed and mitigated in practice, we may take voting action to highlight this.

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE

Generally accepted international standards and principles provide investors with clear frameworks to assess issues and controversies (‘adverse impacts’) surrounding or arising from a business and its operations.

We place particularly importance on the following in our approach:

- **UN Global Compact**
- **UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the “Ruggie Principles”)**
- **International Labour Organisation (ILO) Core Labor Standards**

Where issues arise that suggest a failure to meet generally accepted international standards and principles, this raises questions about a company’s management, culture, operating standards and risks. Where such issues arise, this will be taken into account as part of our deliberations on voting action.